2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

11-28-2012

USA v. Byung;Jang

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012

Recommended Citation
"USA v. Byung;Jang" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 114.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/114

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 12-1683
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
BYUNG JANG
a/k/a Pyung-Hak Jang
a/k/a Xue Hui Shi

BYUNG JANG,
Appellant
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 2-11-cr-00756-001)
District Judge: Honorable Katherine S. Hayden
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 16, 2012
Before: RENDELL, FUENTES, and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: November 28, 2012)
_______________
OPINION
_______________

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Byung Jang was convicted of conspiracy to commit credit card fraud and
aggravated identity theft. He was sentenced to 48 months of incarceration, a sentence
that was at the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range. He now challenges that sentence
on the basis that the District Court refused to grant his request for a downward variance.
For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm Jang’s sentence.
I.
Because we write solely for the parties, we recount only the facts that are relevant
to our disposition.
Jang was one of forty-three individuals arrested and charged for participating in a
widespread identity theft and credit card fraud conspiracy. The conspiracy involved the
purchase and sale of fraudulent identification documents and the inflation of the credit
scores associated with the fraudulent identities. Participants then obtained credit cards in
the names of those identities and made fraudulent charges on these cards using credit card
machines owned by co-conspirators, who could then withdraw money from the merchant
accounts associated with the machines. Members of the conspiracy also made payments
toward the charges on the credit cards from bank accounts containing insufficient funds,
with the result that the payments were initially credited to the cards but then returned to
the bank at significant cost to the credit card companies.
Jang’s involvement in the conspiracy lasted approximately two years and
consisted of, among other things, purchasing a fraudulent identity in order to obtain and
use credit cards, creating false identity documents, attempting to use those false
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documents to obtain genuine documents for fraudulent purposes, using his business to
charge over $29,000 in fraudulent charges, obtaining a social security card and multiple
credit cards under the name “Jimmy Park,” and instructing a confidential informant on
how to participate in the scheme. The losses attributable to Jang’s conduct total over
$315,873.
Jang entered into an open plea agreement with the Government that contained two
stipulations: that the Guidelines loss would be between $200,000 and $400,000 and that
the offenses involved ten or more people. Following Jang’s guilty plea on a two-count
indictment charging him with conspiracy to commit credit card fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 371,
and aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, the District Court sentenced Jang to 48
months of incarceration, the minimum sentence within the calculated Guidelines range of
48 to 54 months. Jang does not dispute the Guidelines range, rather he argues that he
should have been given a downward variance based on the nature and complexity of his
case. Specifically, he argues that the number of defendants involved in the case
prevented him from cooperating with the Government in exchange for a reduced
sentence, justifying a reduced sentence.1
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
We have jurisdiction over the challenge of a conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18
U.S.C. § 3742. When we review a sentence imposed by a district court, we first consider
1

Jang also requested downward departures or variances based on the hardship his
incarceration would have on his family and on lack of guidance as a youth, which the
District Court denied. He does not appeal this aspect of the District Court’s ruling.
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whether the district court committed any procedural error. United States v. Tomko, 562
F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). In the absence of such an error, we then consider
the sentence’s substantive reasonableness, applying the abuse of discretion standard and
in light of the totality of the circumstances. Id. “At both stages of our review, the party
challenging the sentence has the burden of demonstrating unreasonableness.” Id.
Jang does not argue that the District Court committed any procedural error, but
instead alleges that the court erred by failing to acknowledge the effects of the large
number of individuals charged in this matter. Under the three-step framework that
district courts are instructed to follow, the final step that a sentencing court must take is
to give “both sides the chance to argue for the sentences they deem appropriate” and then
“exercise its discretion by considering all of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v.
Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 216-17 (3d Cir. 2008). The record shows that the District Court
considered Jang’s arguments in support of a downward variance based on the complexity
of the case, but ultimately concluded that when considered alongside the other relevant §
3553(a) factors, the large number of co-defendants and complex nature of the case did
not justify a downward variance. The District Court determined that in light of the nature
of the offense, the need for deterrence, and the need to protect the public, a 48-month
sentence was reasonable. We cannot discern any error by the District Court. Because we
cannot hold that “no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence
on the particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided,” United States v.
Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2010), we cannot hold that Jang’s sentence is
unreasonable.
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III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the sentence of the District Court.
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